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EMPLOYMENT LAW 
DUFFIELD v. ROBERTSON STEPHENS & CO. 
144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Company, 1 the United 
States CoUrt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991 prohibited an employer from requiring, 
as a condition of employment, that prospective or current em-
ployees agree in advance to arbitrate Title VII claims arising 
out of the employment relationship. Relying on the purposes 
and legislative history of the 1991 Act, the Ninth Circuit be-
came the only circuit to find that the Act barred these manda-
tory arbitration agreements. 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Pursuant to national securities exchanges regulations re-
quiring employees to agree in advance to arbitrate all employ~ 
ment-related disputes,2 Tonyja Duffield, a securities broker, 
1. See 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998), cert denied, 119 S. Ct. 445 (1998), and cert 
denied, 119 S. Ct. 465 (1998). The appeal from the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California was argued and submitted on March 9, 1998 before 
Circuit Judges William C. Canby and Stephen Reinhardt, and Judge Jane A. Restani, 
United States Court of International Trade, sitting by designation. The decision was 
filed on May 8,1998. Judge Reinhardt authored the opinion. 
2. See Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1186 (9th Cir. 1998). 
Both the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the National Association of Securities 
Dealers (NASD) have rules that compel employees to arbitrate any employment-related 
dispute at the request of their employers. The NASD has since eliminated its manda-
tory arbitration requirement wi.th regard to employment discrimination claims, ac-
cordingly, only the relevant portion of the NYSE rule is reproduced here. 
NYSE Rule 347 provides: 
Any controversy between a registered representative and any member or 
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signed a form waiving her right to a judicial forum to resolve 
disputes arising in the course of her employment with Robert-
son Stephens & Co.3 Despite the agreement to arbitrate, Duf-
field sued her employer in federal court, alleging sex discrimi-
nation and sexual harassment in violation of Title VII as 
amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and California's Fair 
Employment and Housing Act. 4 
As a threshold matter, Duffield sought a declaratory judg-
ment that securities industry employees could not be compelled 
to arbitrate claims of discrimination on the grounds that the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991 precludes compulsory arbitration of 
Title VII claims.5 The United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California denied Duffield's request for 
declaratory relief and granted Robertson Stephens' motion to 
compel arbitration.6 The Ninth Circuit reversed, 7 holding that 
the arbitration provision contained in the U-4 form signed by 
Duffield as a condition of employment was unenforceable with 
respect to Duffield's Title VII and Fair Employment and 
Housing Act (FEHA) claims. 8 
ployment of such registered representative by and with such member or mem-
ber organization shall be settled by arbitration at the instance of any such 
party, in accordance with the arbitration procedure prescribed elsewhere in 
these rules. 
[d. The NYSE has proposed a change that will exclude employment discrimination 
claims from the scope of cases to be arbitrated under the form U-4. The Securities and 
Exchange Commission has yet to approve the change, but because the SEC approved 
the NASD change (see above) they are likely to approve the NYSE change as well. See 
Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Changes to the New York Stock Exchange, Inc., Re-
lating to Arbitration Rules, 63 Fed. Reg. 52,782 (1998). 
3. See Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1186. 
4. See id. 
5. See id. 
6. See id. 
7. See id. at 1203. In addition to her Title VII claims, Duffield alleged state law 
breach of contract, deceit and infliction of emotional distress. The district court's 
holding that Duffield's contract and tort claims were arbitrable was not disturbed on 
appeal. See id. at 1185. 
8. See Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1203. The court observed that since "[plarallel state 
anti-discrimination laws are explicitly made part of Title VII's enforcement scheme, 
FEHA claims are arbitrable to the same extent as Title VII claims." [d. at 1187, n.3. 
This is contrary to California state cases finding that claims under the California Fair 
Employment and Housing Act are not arbitrable. See Armendariz v. Foundation 
Health Psychcare Services, Inc., 68 Cal. App. 4th 374 (1998) (listing California cases 
holding that FEHA claims are arbitrable.) 
2
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III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
Prior to 1991, there was general agreement among the cir-
cuits that arbitration of Title VII claims could not be com-
pelled.9 The basis for this agreement was the United States 
Supreme Court's unanimous holding in Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co. 10 The Court held that an arbitration clause con-
tained in a collective bargaining agreement did not preclude an 
employee from bringing a Title VII Claim in court. II "The pur-
pose and procedures of Title VII," the court explained, "indicate 
that Congress intended federal courts to exercise fmal respon-
sibility for enforcement of Title VII; deferral to arbitral deci-
sions would be inconsistent with that goal. "12 
In 1991, the Supreme Court decided Gilmer v. Inter-
state I Johnson Lane Corp., 13 which held that the Federal Arbi-
tration Act (FAA) required the enforcement of a mandatory 
arbitration clause contained in the Form U-4.14 Gilmer in-
volved a claim of age discrimination brought under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).15 The Court held 
that agreements to arbitrate statutory claims should be en-
forced unless the plaintiff could show congressional intent to 
9. See Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1188 (9th Cir. 1998). 
10. See id. at 1188. See also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
11. See Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1188. 
12. [d. 
13 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
14. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26. The Uniform Application for Securities Industry 
Registration or Transfer, or U-4, is a standardized registration form generally required 
of all employees in the securities industry. By signing the U-4, an employee agrees to 
abide by the rules ofthe securities organizations of which their employer is a member. 
Paragraph 5 of the Form U -4 provides in relevant part as follows: "I agree to arbitrate 
any dispute, claim or controversy that may arise between me and my fIrm, or a cus-
tomer, or any other person, that is required to be arbitrated under the rules, constitu-
tions, or by-laws of the organizations with which I register .... " Duffield, 144 F.3d at 
1186. 
15. See Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1188. After the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
Gilmer, Congress amended the ADEA to provide that all waivers of rights under the 
Act, including a jury trial, must be "knowing and voluntary." See id. at 1190, n. 5. See 
also Older Workers Protection Act of 1990, 29 U.S.C. § 626(D(1)(C). The Supreme 
Court did not consider this new statutory language in Gilmer, therefore, current ADEA 
claims may require a determination as to whether an agreement to submit to arbitra-
tion was "knowing and voluntary." See Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1190, n. 5. Having found 
the U-4 unenforceable as to Duffield's Title VII claims, the Ninth Circuit did not reach 
the question of whether Duffield's waiver was in fact "knowing and voluntary." See id. 
at 1190 n. 7. 
3
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preclude arbitration. 16 Since the Court found no conflict be-
tween the arbitration agreement in Gilmer and the ADEA's 
underlying purposes, the Court upheld the enforceability of the 
Form U-4 in that circumstance. 17 To determine intent, courts 
were directed to look to a statute's text and legislative history 
to ascertain whether there was a conflict between arbitration 
and the statute's goals. 18 
Almost simultaneously with the Gilmer decision, Congress 
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 19 Section 118 of the Act 
provides that "[w]here appropriate and to the extent authorized 
by law, the use of alternative means of dispute resolution in-
cluding, ... arbitration is encouraged to resolve disputes arising 
under [Title VII]."2O Citing to the plain language of section 118, 
Robertson Stephens' urged that this language demonstrated a 
Congressional intent to encourage compulsory arbitration, and 
specifically, that the language "to the extent authorized by law" 
demonstrated a congressional desire to codify Gilmer. Thus, 
according to Robertson Stephens' interpretation, compulsory 
arbitration was properly among the "alternative means of dis-
pute resolution" authorized by section 118.21 
After thoroughly examining the legislative history of the 
1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act, the Ninth Circuit 
flatly rejected Robertson Stephens' argument.22 The broad 
purpose of the 1991 amendments, the court stated, was to ex-
pand employee rights and to broaden remedies available to 
civil rights plaintiffs.23 Given this purpose, it would be "para-
doxical" to conclude that the language in section 118 was 
meant to encourage a process by which employees are forced, 
16. See Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1189. 
17. Seeid. 
18. See id. at 1190. See also Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26; Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. 
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985) (holding that "[h)aving made 
the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be held to it unless Congress itself has 
evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights 
at issue"). See Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1190. 
19. See Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1189. 
20. [d. 
21. See id. at 119l. 
22. See id. at 1190. 
23. See Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1192. 
4
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as a condition of employment, to surrender their rights to a 
judicial forum in exchange for compelled arbitration. 24 The 
court considered it far more plausible that the section 118 lan-
guage was meant to encourage voluntary agreements to arbi-
trate.25 Robertson Stephens urged unsuccessfully that the lan-
guage "where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law" 
was intended to codify the Gilmer decision. Though the 1991 
Civil Rights Act was passed after Gilmer, the Ninth Circuit 
noted that section 118 was drafted long before the Gilmer deci-
sion, and if anything, was meant to codify the law as expressed 
inAlexander.26 Even though the section 118 language could be 
interpreted as ambiguous, the court held that any doubt on this 
point could be resolved by even a cursory glance at section 
118's legislative history. In the court's view, the statute's his-
tory confIrmed that Congress in no way intended to incorporate 
Gilmer into Title VII, or to authorize compulsory arbitration of 
Title VII claims.27 Because the language "to the extent 
authorized by law" was intended to refer to the law as it ex-
isted when section 118 was drafted, the arbitration of Title VII 
claims could not be compelled. 28 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF DECISION 
The controversy over mandatory arbitration has grown as 
the number of employers requiring employees to agree to man-
datory arbitration has increased.29 The Ninth Circuit appears 
to be a lone voice in holding that the 1991 amendments to the 
Civil Rightj:l Act bar mandatory arbitration of rights provided 
by that Act. Though few appellate courts have dealt with the 
precise issue of whether the 1991 Civil Rights Act demon-
24. See id. at 1193. 
25. See id. The court goes on to say that it is "at least a mild paradox" to interpret 
section 118 as encouraging compulsory arbitration, when the section's other "encour-
aged" types of alternative dispute resolution-"settlement negotiations, conciliation, 
facilitation, factfinding [and) minitrials"- are all consensual. [d. at 1193, n. 13. 
26. See Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1195. 
27. See id. 
28. See id. 
29. See generally Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player 
Effect, 1 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMPLOYMENT POL'Y J. 189 (1997); Robert N. Covington, 
Employment Arbitration after Gilmer: Have Labor Courts Come to the United States?, 
15 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMPLOYMENT L.J. 345 (1998). 
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strates congressional intent to ban pre-dispute agreements to 
arbitrate employment discrimination claims, many appellate 
courts have held that Gilmer applies to Title VII claims and 
that pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate Title VII claims are 
permissible.30 Critics of the use of arbitration in employment 
discrimination disputes argue that arbitrators are not neutral, 
or are untrained, that reduced availability of discovery in arbi-
tration favors employers, and that arbitration may limit cer-
tain remedies, especially punitive damages.31 Indeed, several 
courts declining to compel arbitration of civil rights claims 
have done so on the basis of bias or procedural unfairness of a 
particular arbitration system, rather than any perceived ten-
sion between the goals of Title VII and arbitration itself. 32 
The Supreme Court has yet to consider whether the 1991 
amendments to the Civil Rights Act preclude mandatory, pre-
dispute arbitration in the individual employment context. Un-
til then, debate over whether or not Congress intended to en-
courage or preclude mandatory arbitration when it drafted sec-
tion 118 will likely continue. 
Kate S. Langer * 
30. See e.g., Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc., 146 F.3d 175, 179, 182-83 (3rd Cir. 
1998) (interpreting Section ll8's reference to "the extent authorized by law" as refer-
ring to the Federal Arbitration Act, not to case law as it stood at the time Congress 
drafted the 1991 Civil Rights Act, and that there is no inherent conflict between the 
goals of Title VII and the Federal Arbitration Act); Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 98-1246, 1999 WL 80964 at *22 (1st Cir.(Mass.) 1999) 
(holding that neither the language of section ll8 nor the legislative history demon-
strates an intent to preclude pre-dispute arbitration agreements.); Koveleskie v. SBC 
Capital Markets, Inc., 167 F.3d 361 (7th Cir. 1999); and Mouton v. Metropolitan Life 
Ins. Co., 147 F.3d 453 (5th Cir. 1998). 
31. See Developments in the Law- Employment Discrimination Mandatory Arbitra-
tion of Statutory Employment Disputes, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1670, 1674-75, 1680-82 
(1996). 
32. See generally, Dennis Nolan, Labor and Employment Arbitration: What's Jus-
tice Got To Do With It?, 53 Nov. DISP. RESOL. J. 40 (1998). 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 2000. 
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